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Fulcher and Hammerl’s (2001) important exploration of the role of contingency 
awareness in evaluative conditioning (EC) raises a lot of issues for discussion: (1) 
what boundaries, if any, exist between EC and affective learning paradigms; (2) if EC 
does occur without awareness does this mean it is non-propositional learning; (3) is 
EC driven by Stimulus-Response (S-R), rather than Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S), 
associations and if so should it then surprise us that contingency awareness is not 
important; and (4) if S-R associations are at the heart of EC, should we automatically 
assume EC is part of a different learning mechanism to autonomic Pavlovian 
conditioning (Field, 2000ab)? This article, after a critical review of Fulcher and 
Hammerl’s work, discusses these issues with reference to what can be realistically 
inferred about the mechanisms underlying EC. 
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WHEN ALL IS STILL CONCEALED: ARE WE CLOSER TO 
UNDERSTANDING THE MECHANISMS UNDERLYING 
EVALUATIVE CONDITIONING? 
After reviewing the literature investigating the effects of contingency awareness on 
evaluative conditioning (EC), Field (2000a) noted that although there was good 
evidence that contingency awareness was not necessary for learning about tastes, the 
evidence that learning using visual stimuli could occur without awareness was 
controvertible. This is a view recently endorsed by Lovibond and Shanks (in press) in 
a detailed review of the role of contingency awareness in conditioning in general. Field 
noted that  (1) early studies using visual stimuli utilised a paradigm that was 
subsequently shown to be flawed (Field & Davey, 1999); (2) later studies that did not 
use this paradigm (such as Baeyens, Crombez, Van den Bergh, & Eelen, 1988; 
Baeyens, Eelen, Van den Bergh, and Crombez, 1989; Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez and 
Van den Bergh, 1992; Baeyens, Hermans and Eelen, 1993; Hammerl & Grabitz, 1993) 
looked at contingency awareness only as a tangential theme; (3) there is an 
important distinction to be made between demand awareness (a lack of which should 
not influence conditioning) and contingency awareness (a lack of which could influence 
conditioning) and some studies cited as evidence for conditioning without awareness 
probably actually measure demand awareness (e.g. Stuart, Shimp and Engle, 1987; 
Hammerl & Grabitz, 1993); (4) the majority of studies investigating EC do not use 
between-group controls to demonstrate that learning is associative (see Field & 
Davey, 1998; Davey 1994) and if the learning in these studies was non-associative 
then there is no reason why it should have been affected by contingency awareness; 
and (5) the validity of post hoc measures of contingency awareness will always be 
controversial (for reasons detailed by Lovibond & Shanks, in press; Shanks & St. 
John, 1994) and so systematic attempts to manipulate contingency awareness should 
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be attempted. Field (2000b) also suggested that like autonomic conditioning, in which 
evidence for learning without awareness is stronger for certain learning episodes, EC 
may occur more readily without awareness for certain ecologically-important learning 
events (such as tastes, touch and odors). The implication is that learning without 
awareness in the visual domain is particularly important theoretically, because it does 
not involve life-threatening outcomes (such as ingesting poisons, injury from touching 
abrasive surfaces, or inhaling noxious gases).  
Fulcher and Hammerl (this issue) present attempts to manipulate awareness in a 
systematic way. Their study is a welcomed advance to our understanding of 
contingency awareness and EC; nevertheless, this commentary will focus on the 
extent to which the authors demonstrate associative EC without contingency 
awareness and the theoretical implications. The main focus will be on the experiment 
using visual stimuli because these findings more interesting theoretically. 
 The Experiments: When is Associative Learning not Associative Learning? 
Davey, (1994), Field (1996, 1997) and Field and Davey (1997, 1998, 1999) have long 
advocated the use of between-subject control groups that allow firm conclusions to be 
made about whether learning effects are associative. The logic is simple: to infer that 
learning is the direct cause of particular associations between conditioned stimuli (CS) 
and an unconditioned stimuli (UCS), situations in which CS-UCS associations are 
present must be compared with situations in which CS-UCS associations are absent. A 
no-treatment condition is such a situation (CS-UCS associations are absent), but it 
does not control for exposure and so the BSB control (Field, 1996, 1997) has been 
advocated, which contains no CS-UCS associations and controls for exposure too. This 
control is especially important when trying to demonstrate that EC can occur without 
contingency awareness because this functional characteristic, if shown, would set EC 
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apart from autonomic conditioning (in which conditioning without awareness is rarely, 
if ever, found—see Lovibond & Shanks, in press; Dawson & Schell, 1987 for reviews). 
Autonomic Pavlovian conditioning depends upon stimulus-stimulus (S-S) associations 
(Rescorla, 1980) and so for differences between this form of learning and EC to be 
theoretically interesting EC needs to be shown to be associative too; otherwise it 
would be unsurprising that EC does not rely on contingency awareness whereas 
autonomic conditioning does—because the latter is driven by an associative process 
whereas the former is not. 
Even those who do not advocate its use acknowledge that the BSB control proposed 
by Field (1996, 1997) allows unequivocal conclusions about the associative properties 
of any observed evaluative learning (De Houwer, Thomas & Baeyens, in press; 
Baeyens, De Houwer, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1998). Fulcher and Hammerl’s 
experiments have no such control because they argue, “Hammerl and Grabitz (2000) 
show that evaluative learning is also demonstrable in a between-subjects design and 
that the standard within-subjects control conditions (i.e. N-N stimulus pairs) are an 
appropriate way to control nonassociative influences”. Hammerl and Grabitz do indeed 
follow Field and Davey’s (1998) suggestions and compare effects in experimental 
conditions to those in a BSB control and this is excellent to see, however, its inclusion 
in past research in no way precludes its use in research addressing a different 
question (where, as argued above, it is imperative to demonstrate that learnt 
responses are associative)—that would be like suggesting that researchers doing 
clinical drug trials stop using placebo controls just because past research has used 
them! Also Hammerl and Grabitz (2000) have not shown that the within subject 
controls are adequate, because this issue is not subject to empirical test. To 
demonstrate that N-N controls are adequate one would have to show that no 
associations are formed between the Neutral CS and the Neutral UCS when this 
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control is employed. In these pairings no shift in evaluative rating is expected anyway 
(i.e. the null case is predicted), therefore, no change is not necessarily indicative of no 
CS-UCS association, it could equally be indicative of a CS-UCS association being 
formed, but having no observable effect (as predicted). The only way to ensure 
comparison between CS-UCS pairings that have entered into associations and those 
that have not is to remove the associations by presenting CSs and UCS in such a way 
that they cannot be associated—something that the BSB control does but the N-N 
pairings do not do. 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, Fulcher and Hammerl do make good use of CSs that 
are not paired with a UCS in Experiment 3. Although Rescorla (1967) has famously 
written of how such a control does not remove associations completely (because the 
CS could still be associated with the absence of a UCS), these pairings make an 
interesting comparison between CSs that have entered associations with UCSs and 
CSs that either haven’t entered associations, or have entered into associations with 
the absence of a UCS. However, Fulcher and Hammerl’s findings are complicated in 
that when the results of the group in which effects were found are looked at (the 
25ms condition) they report a significant assimilation effect in the normal instruction 
group with ratings of ideographs paired with smiling faces being higher than ratings of 
those paired with frowning faces, but that “neither of these differed significantly from 
the mean rating of ideographs paired with no face”. For the participants told to ignore 
the influence of the faces, there was a contrast effect but only CSs paired with smiling 
faces showed any difference to CSs paired with no face. In fact this contrast effect is 
largely the product of an effect for CSs paired with smiling faces because this was the 
only pairing for which instruction group differences exist. These comparisons are the 
nearest we have to a comparison between CSs that did enter into associations and 
those that may, or may not, have done. These comparisons are far from uniformly 
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significant and so raise some concern about the extent to which we can infer 
associative learning. The data for the effects of reactance are more promising in that 
for the low reactance group (at a presentation rate of 12.5ms) a difference was found 
between CSs paired with smiling faces and those paired with no faces. However, for 
the high reactance group no differences between CS-UCS pairs and CS-no UCS pairs 
were observed. At a slower presentation rate (25ms) there were no effects in the low 
reactance group but this time in the high reactance group a difference was found 
between CSs paired with smiling faces and those paired with no faces. These results 
are somewhat puzzling because they collapse across the type of instruction given. On 
average it might be reasonable to expect half of the participants in each reactance 
group to have been told to discount the effect of the affective stimuli and half to have 
been told not to. This will mitigate responses in both groups, and to get a clearer 
insight into the reactance data it would be useful to know whether reactance 
interacted with the type of instruction.  
To what extent do the results of Experiment 3 support the position that EC 
conditioning occurs without awareness? The truly unaware group (presentation rate of 
12.5ms) showed no effects when the effects of the instructions were analysed, and for 
the reactance data only the CSs paired with happy faces seemed to differ from those 
paired with nothing. In the two aware groups (50ms and 125ms) there seemed to be 
no evidence of any kind of learning at all. Fulcher and Hammerl make much of the 
apparent contract effects, yet the two aware (by their definition) conditions actually 
just prevent learning. The main body of significant results lie in the 25ms presentation 
rate group and recognition rates for this group (taking a conservative estimate of 61% 
from Fulcher and Hammerl Figure 3) are significantly above chance (Binomial test p < 
0.05). Although the analysis of aware and unaware participants (footnote 2 of Fulcher 
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and Hammerl) does corroborate their main supposition, the contrasts between CSs 
paired with faces and those not are absent. 
The point here is that the evidence for associative learning is far from clear-cut. There 
is better evidence when smiling faces are used (in fact there is very little evidence for 
the frowning faces), yet this was not predicted. A convincing argument that these 
findings are associative needs to explain these unpredicted inconsistencies. 
Further complications arise in Experiment 3 because (1) the valence of the ideographs 
was not determined pre-experimentally (so it is difficult to establish whether these 
stimuli were in fact neutral to begin with); (2) the instructions in Experiment 3 may 
have enhanced demand awareness (by making it apparent that the effect of the 
valence of the stimuli was important to the experimenters); and (3) the UCSs 
contained emotional cues (smiles or frowns) so were participants really responding to 
the emotion elicited by the UCS faces, or responding to the emotional content of the 
UCSs? This later point is interesting because it questions whether the experiment 
represents direct learning or the vicarious learning described by Rachman (1977). 
The need for appropriate controls and the extent to which any experiment 
demonstrates conditioning without awareness can be argued from many views: 
whatever views I might have on their experiments, Fulcher and Hammerl will no doubt 
provide an eloquent and compelling defence. My intention is merely to illustrate that 
the room for debate highlights the difficulty in conducting research on issues of 
awareness in learning (see Shanks & St. John, 1994; Field 2000a). Fulcher and 
Hammerl have made a substantial advance in trying to systematically manipulate 
awareness, but even then it is extremely difficult to manipulate experimental 
conditions such that one group is unaware of all contingencies and another group is 
aware of all contingencies. Field (2001) and Field and Moore (2001) have similar 
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experiences and propose that a better analytical strategy is to accept that some 
participants will be aware of some contingencies and to model the effects of 
awareness at a per-contingency level. This approach has two advantages (1) 
information can be analysed about responses to a particular stimulus when 
participants were aware of the CS-UCS pairing and when they were not; and (2) when 
participants were aware of some pairings but not others information can be analysed 
about the relative difference in their responses. The advent of complex statistical 
procedures such as structural equation modelling (see Hoyle, 1995) makes this form 
of analysis possible. Indeed, when Field and Moore (2001) used such a technique they 
found that contingency awareness was not a moderating factor in responses to 
stimuli, but that attention and association (i.e. paired presentations versus BSB 
control) were (Field, 2001). 
Theoretical Considerations 
Leaving methodological reservations aside and taking Fulcher and Hammerl’s work at 
face value, the theoretical implications of their findings are important—but not fully 
explored. They correctly note the similarity between the paradigm in Experiment 3 
and the affective priming paradigm and conclude that “evaluative learning and 
affective priming may result from common learning mechanisms”. What’s important 
here is that some clear distinctions are made between the two processes at procedural 
and mechanistic levels. At a procedural level there are two main distinctions between 
affective priming and EC: (1) in affective priming responses are measured ‘on-line’ 
whereas in EC responses are measured off-line; and (2) in affective priming the 
affective stimulus appears before the other stimulus. Fulcher and Hammerl, based on 
Fulcher’s (2000) study, claim there are no differences between on-line and off-line 
ratings. If so, then the main procedural distinction is the order of stimuli; the priming 
paradigm (and Fulcher and Hammerl’s Experiment 3) represents backwards 
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conditioning. In the autonomic literature backwards conditioning is typically very hard 
to establish unless the UCSs are very extreme (see Davey, 1989; Mackintosh, 1983 
for reviews) and does not tie in comfortably with expectancy models of conditioning in 
which the predictability of the UCS is fundamental (e.g. Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). If 
Fulcher and Hammerl’s Experiment 3 represent backwards conditioning then it is 
unusual and may support the proposition that EC is distinct from Pavlovian learning; 
however, if the experiment is an example of affective priming then demonstrating 
conditioning without contingency awareness ceases to be theoretically interesting 
(because different processes are being compared—it is like comparing apples with 
pears). If, as Fulcher and Hammerl suggest, affective priming and EC are part and 
parcel of the same process then presumably researchers will need to explain (at a 
mechanistic level) several conflicting results: First, why, in previous research, have 
forward pairings produced strong learning effects (Baeyens, Eelen & van den Bergh, 
1990; Hammerl, Bloch & Silverthorne, 1997; Fulcher & Cocks, 1997; Todrank, Byrnes, 
Wrzesniewski, & Rozin, 1995; Martin & Levey, 1987; Levey & Martin, 1987, 1975), yet 
are now found to produce weaker learning, no learning or contrast effects (Fulcher 
and Hammerl, this issue; Fulcher, 2000)? Second, why do backward pairings produce 
learning comparable to (Todrank, et al., 1995; Krosnick, Betz, Jussim & Lynn, 1992; 
Stuart, Shimp & Engle, 1987; Martin & Levey, 1978) or stronger than (Fulcher, 2000) 
forward pairings yet on other occasions produces no such effects (Hammerl & Grabitz, 
1993)? 
Finally, if EC were an example of associative learning that occurs without conscious 
awareness of CS-UCS contingencies then what can be said about the underlying 
mechanisms? Lovibond and Shanks (in press) recently review existing models of 
Pavlovian learning and make a distinction between single process and dual process 
models. In essence a single process model is one in which propositional learning 
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causes contingency awareness which in turn causes the conditioned response. The 
dual process model is one in which propositional learning causes contingency 
awareness, but some non-propositional system causes conditioned responding (so 
contingency awareness need not correlate with learning). If EC were convincingly 
shown to occur without awareness then, according to Lovibond and Shanks, this 
implies a dual process model (although as Field & Moore, 2001, point out an absence 
of awareness does not necessarily rule out the single process model because other 
factors may drive both awareness and learning). This being so, then EC is a 
nonpropositional learning process. As early as 1955 Razran proposed a levels-of-
learning approach which at the lowest level consists of non-associative learning. Later 
theorists such as Davey (1983), suggest that lower level reflexive stimulus-response 
(S-R) associations may be formed when the response is relatively salient and is 
enough “to overshadow other internal or external stimulation which is contiguous with 
the CS.” Davey suggests such learning should occur when participants can easily 
discriminate their reactions to stimuli. Responses to noxious tastes (e.g. Baeyens et 
al., 1988), odors (Stevenson, Boakes & Wilson, 2000; Todrank et al., 1995), touch 
(Fulcher & Hammerl, this issue; Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000) and extreme visual 
material (Field, 2001; Field & Moore, 2001) may well be salient, and if so, would not 
require contingency awareness because S-R associations rather than CS-UCS 
associations are the driving force behind learnt responses.  
For Every Action there is an Equal and Opposite Reaction 
Fulcher and Hammerl conclude that: “implicit evaluative learning is not an 
experimental artifact but is a robust effect”. However, the real issue is probably 
whether implicit evaluative learning is associative and if so what associations are 
formed (S-R or S-S)? EC research has sadly lacked the theoretical insights necessary 
to move us forward. 
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Even with just the issue of contingency awareness, there is evidence that contingency 
awareness facilitates conditioning (see Field, 2000a; Field & Davey, 1998 for reviews) 
does not impede learning (e.g. Field, 2001; Field & Moore, 2001; Baeyens et al., 
1990; Hammerl et al., 1997; Fulcher & Cocks, 1997; Todrank et al., 1995; Martin & 
Levey, 1987; Levey & Martin, 1987, 1975), and does impede learning (Fulcher & 
Hammerl, this issue; Hammerl & Grabitz, 2000; Fulcher, 2000). There is also evidence 
that EC can occur without awareness (e.g. Fulcher & Hammerl, this issue; Field & 
Moore, 2001, Experiments 1 and 3; Baeyens et al., 1990) and that EC cannot occur 
without awareness (Field & Moore, 2001, Experiment 2; and see Field 2000a, Field & 
Davey, 1998 for reviews). It is imperative that researchers seek to discover why these 
inconsistent results keep occurring and future research needs to try to do three 
things: (1) employ inferential techniques that enable firm conclusions about the types 
of associations formed during EC; (2) achieve some standardization in methodologies; 
and (3) look at contingency awareness in a more dynamic way by exploring other 
factors that may drive both awareness and learning (Field & Moore, 2001).  Only then 
can we begin to build theoretical models to explain the diversity of effects found 
within this intriguing phenomenon. 
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